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This special issue seeks to bring together contributions of a nascent community of scholars 
studying infrastructure delivery models; what they are, how they are created, and how they 
change over time and across institutional fields. This area of research is crucial to advancing 
the field of project management and, with its links to neighboring fields such as innovation, 
organizational theory, and strategic management, is a fertile ground for developing new 
insights and knowledge. Before we introduce the articles that make up the special issue, we 
describe the policy environment and drivers for innovation in infrastructure delivery models, 
situate infrastructure delivery models within project management scholarship, and provide 
some conceptual scaffolding for considering the nature of innovation in delivery models. We 
then turn to a discussion of how each article in the special issue advances our knowledge of 
delivery models and project management. Drawing inspiration from the articles, we conclude 
by sketching out the building blocks and core conceptual components of a delivery model, 
and laying the foundations for a more nuanced comparison of existing, emerging, and novel 
delivery models over time and across institutional fields.  
 
What is Infrastructure and Why is it Important? 
 
Infrastructure incorporates the systems, network utilities, constructs, and other physical assets 
that underpin and enable social and economic development (Bell, 1973; Chandler, 1977). It 
connects firms and markets and provides people, communities, and organizations with 
essential services. It delivers significant benefits, both directly through the services it 
delivers, and indirectly, through the impact of those services on the rest of the economy. 
Countries depend on infrastructure to move people, materials, goods, and information 
rapidly, efficiently, and reliably between geographical locations (e.g., road, rail, aviation, and 
telecommunications); to provide access to dependable and secure sources of water and 
energy (e.g., water, gas, electricity, nuclear, and renewables); to process and treat waste (e.g., 
sewer systems and incineration plants); to educate, support, and protect a literate, healthy, 
and law-abiding population (e.g., schools, public housing, prisons, and hospitals); and to 
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create a culturally diverse and advanced civil society (e.g., sport stadiums, opera houses, and 
other distinctive buildings). 
 
Infrastructure is expensive to build, operate, and maintain, and often produces large negative 
externalities, such as CO2 emissions, noise, and pollution. It is typically long-lived, so the 
costs of any poor choices, let alone mistakes, can be extremely high. And, as we will see, 
major infrastructure projects are often delivered late, over budget, and fail to achieve their 
expected benefits. Given its importance for the prosperity of societies in the 21st century, 
public and private actors are searching for new and improved ways of delivering 
infrastructure projects. In mature market economies, governments in the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, and others are experimenting with new ways of delivering 
infrastructure projects to repair, upgrade, and replace ageing and obsolete assets such as 
metro, rail, and road networks built many years ago. In emerging market economies, 
governments in India, Mexico, and many other countries face difficulties in attracting the 
funds and developing the capabilities needed to undertake huge investments in new 
infrastructure to meet the needs of their rapidly urbanizing and growing populations (e.g., 
Mahalingam, 2009). Confronting these challenges requires the development of radically new 
delivery models.  
 
Delivering Infrastructure in a Changing Political Environment 
 
Understanding the new project delivery arrangements requires an appreciation of how 
infrastructure was owned, organized, and managed in the past. In the United States and 
Europe, telegraph, telephone, railway, electricity, and many other infrastructure networks in 
the 19th century were initially financed and built by private firms in a competitive market 
(Levitt, Scott, & Garvin, 2019). These early forays were subject to market failure after some 
initial successes, and private firms could no longer attract investment or offer efficient 
alternatives to local, regional, or national monopolies. Most infrastructure networks 
eventually formed natural monopolies or contained monopoly elements. Thus, how they were 
financed and organized to provide essential services was a matter for governments to decide. 
As a result, during most of the 20th century, infrastructure was placed under monopolistic 
public ownership or regulated private provision. National, regional, and local governments 
played a major role in the funding, development, and operation of infrastructure.  
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During the 1980s and 1990s, however, when a liberal political agenda took hold in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere, calls intensified for private sector involvement in the 
construction and operation of national infrastructure utilities, airports, ports, railways, and 
other networks. Facing increasing pressure to reduce public spending, governments around 
the world began to explore how the private sector could be used to finance and build 
infrastructure projects (Gil & Beckman, 2009; Levitt et al., 2019). There were two main 
arguments motivating this agenda. The first was that private finance would allow 
governments to attract the investment needed to launch much needed infrastructure projects 
without raising taxes, issuing bonds, or increasing government spending. The second was that 
private firms had organizational advantages that made them more efficient and customer-
focused than government-owned monopolies. Efforts were then made to design new delivery 
models aligning public and private interests.  
 
We refer to the United Kingdom, which has been a laboratory for experimentation in 
infrastructure project delivery, to illustrate how politics, policy, and project management 
intersect to shape innovation in delivery models. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was 
introduced in 1992 as the primary means of funding new public projects, such as schools, 
hospitals, prisons, railways, and highways. Under PFI, private sector firms are required to 
finance and design, build, and operate assets, such as the London Underground, often for 
many years. PFI was attractive during a time of fiscal austerity, because private investment in 
infrastructure did not count as part of government spending (the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement), but did commit the government to regular expenditures spread over the life 
cycle of the asset for decades ahead. PFI required private firms to develop entirely new 
delivery models. For example, under the £400 million PFI contract awarded in 1995 to 
modernize the Northern Line of the London Underground, Alstom was not required to build a 
specified number of trains, but to ensure that 96 trains were available for service every day 
during the life of the project (Wolmar, 2002). Provided the trains were available, Alstom was 
paid around £40 to £45 million a year plus a bonus, but had to pay a penalty every time the 
trains were cancelled because no train was available.  
 
Whereas under PFI, the private sector finances projects and assumes the risk, under the new 
policy of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) introduced in 1997, the state assumes greater 
responsibility for project delivery. PPP infrastructure projects—such as High-Speed 1, the 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link project—are partly financed by the private sector, but the state 
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retains ownership of the assets and underwrites or shares some of the risk. The private sector 
firm or consortium is paid for investing in the assets through customer charges or government 
payments. PPPs were already used in Australia in the early 1990s to finance and build roads, 
hospitals, water and electric power; spreading during the mid-1990s to ports, prisons, and 
sport stadia; in the late 1990s to airports; and in the early 2000s to defense, schools, and 
courts. PPPs have been used in the United States since the 1990s to provide water supply and 
wastewater treatment, run prisons (Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009), and adopted by many 
European countries including Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and Italy 
(Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2008).  
 
While a growing number of countries are adopting PPPs, this model for delivering 
infrastructure projects has not only met with mixed success, but is increasingly viewed with 
skepticism in the United Kingdom. Reports by the UK National Audit Office (NAO, 2003, 
2005) comparing the construction performance of PPP and traditional procurement found that 
only 30% of conventionally procured projects were delivered on time and 27% within budget 
compared to figures of 70% and 78% for PPPs, respectively. Despite this relative success, 
however, the high-profile failure of several early PFI and PPP projects and the collapse of 
major private entities (e.g., London Underground’s Metronet and Tube Lines consortiums) 
illustrates the difficulties in writing equitable and efficient contracts for large, complex, and 
long-term infrastructure projects. Following a detailed review of the performance of PFI, the 
UK government published a report in 2012 outlining a new approach called PF2 (HM 
Treasury, 2012). The report recognized that PFI works well when conditions are stable and 
predictable, but identified a number of problems associated with the original PFI delivery 
model, such as a slow and expensive procurement process, the inability to adapt PFI contracts 
to changes in requirements during the life cycle of an asset, and a failure to transfer risk to the 
private sector. However, PF2 was used only sparingly and in November 2018 the UK 
government announced that it would no longer be used as the model to deliver government 
projects (HM Treasury, 2018).  
 
Innovation in Infrastructure Project Delivery  
 
Against the backdrop of these wider changes in the policy environment, clients and 
contractors also began to recognize that there was a need to improve performance by 
developing new models of project delivery. Under the traditional approach most commonly 
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used in the 1980s and 1990s, clients assumed that they could identify most of the 
eventualities that might impact a project, freeze the design at an early stage, select the lowest 
cost tender, and use fixed-price contracts that transfer risks to the contractor. This 
arrangement created adversarial relationships between parties when things went wrong or the 
project was delayed or over budget. Clients and contractors would often end up in court to 
resolve disputes over responsibility for scope changes or unforeseen problems leading to cost 
and time overruns (Egan, 1998).  
 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the Jubilee Line Extension project of the London 
Underground was built to connect the West End with the Canary Wharf office complex and 
south and east parts of the city. It was a fixed-price contract scheduled for completion in 
March 1997 at a cost of £2.1 billion (Wolmar, 2002). Many contractors on the project had 
submitted low-cost tenders with the expectation that they could recoup their costs and earn 
additional profits by submitting £500 million for claims to changes in specifications and 
unexpected difficulties during construction. As a result of these disputes, the project was 
eventually £1.4 billion over budget and opened for service two years later than originally 
planned. 
 
In different parts of the world, sponsors (owners and operators of the assets), clients, and 
their partners (consultants and contractors) began to search for more flexible and adaptive 
ways of delivering large infrastructure projects (Lahdenperä, 2012). They wanted to 
encourage collaboration, stimulate innovation, and create added value through the entire life 
cycle from design, construction, assembly, and integration to operations and maintenance.  
 
In the United Kingdom, a new form of relational contract between client and contractors 
working together in integrated project teams was developed for the North Sea oil and gas 
exploration projects in the 1990s (Barlow, 2000). This collaborative approach was built on to 
deliver the £4.3 billion Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5) project between 2002 and 2008 (Gil, 2009; 
Gil & Tether, 2011; Davies, Dodgson, & Gann, 2016). Under the T5 Agreement, the client—
BAA, the former state-owned British Airports Authority, now owned by Heathrow Airport 
Limited—entered into a novel risk-bearing contract and worked with contractors in integrated 
project teams (Gil, 2007, 2009; Davies, Gann, & Douglas, 2009). The project was pioneering 
in its use of offsite prefabrication, modular construction, and digital technology to model the 
design and construction of the T5 infrastructure (Tee, Davies, & Whyte, 2019). The T5 
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project radically transformed how subsequent infrastructure megaprojects—such as the 
London 2012 Olympics and Crossrail—are delivered in the United Kingdom and initiated a 
national and increasingly international narrative about the need for flexibility, collaboration, 
and innovation (Davies, 2017; Davies, Dodgson, Gann, & MacAulay, 2017). Inspired by T5, 
for example, Crossrail was an early UK adopter of digital technology called Building 
Information Modelling (BIM) and pioneered the development of an innovation program 
encouraging contractors, suppliers, and other stakeholders to develop, implement, and share 
new ideas, technologies, and practices (Davies, MacAulay, DeBarro, & Thurston, 2014; 
DeBarro, MacAulay, Davies, Wolstenholme, Gann, & Pelton, 2015; Dodgson, Gann, 
MacAulay, & Davies, 2016).  
 
The North Sea experience influenced the development of project delivery models in Australia 
(Lahdenperä, 2012). The “alliancing approach” created by BP to build the Andrew offshore 
oil platform in the North Sea (Barlow, 2000) was adopted in 1994 to deliver the Wandoo 
offshore oil platform in Western Australia and, as a result of its success, spread to many other 
Australian infrastructure projects (Wood & Duffield, 2009). Collaborative relationships and 
risk-sharing contracts between project participants were a major feature of this approach 
(Love, Mistry, & Davis, 2010; Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014). This Australian model was 
then drawn on by those developing the Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) model in the United 
States in order to achieve a close collaboration between the owner and team of designers, 
contractors, and subcontractors (Levitt, 2011; Levitt et al., 2019).  
 
The similarity of these approaches in response to “the appropriate way to organize” (Orr, 
Scott, Levitt, Artto, & Kujala, 2011, p. 29) suggests that there may be an isomorphic trend 
underway as individuals (consultants, academics, and managers), organizations, and 
institutions around the world copy and learn from pioneers of the new project delivery 
models. In this issue, Hall and Scott provide a fascinating account of how this process 
unfolded within the United States based on a case study of Sutter Health; at times we have 
ourselves seen glimpses of this process on a global scale. For example, when designing what 
would become the T5 delivery model, BAA was strongly influenced by the very same actors 
as Sutter Health—the Lean Construction Institute. And, more recently, the United Kingdom’s 
Institution of Civil Engineers has developed a collaborative delivery model called “Project 
13,” (Infrastructure Client Group, 2017), which is now being applied on major infrastructure 
projects in Australia. 
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Infrastructure, Project Management, and Delivery Models 
 
Having described the policy context and innovative efforts to create new and improved 
delivery models, it is now important to consider how infrastructure projects have been treated 
in the broader project management literature. Project management scholars have identified 
the distinct types of projects used to deliver large, complex capital investments in 
infrastructure, including “major projects” (Morris & Hough, 1987; Morris, 1994, 2013), 
“large engineering projects” (Millers & Lessard, 2001), and “global projects” (Scott, Levitt, 
& Orr, 2011). In recent years, the term “megaproject”—defined as projects with a capital cost 
of US$1 billion or more (set at 2003 prices)—has become perhaps the most widely used 
category to describe large-scale infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 
2003; Flyvbjerg, 2014, 2016; Merrow, 2011). Megaprojects are high risk, difficult to manage 
ventures. Large, complex infrastructure projects have earned a reputation for being mostly 
late, over budget, and failing to achieve their original objectives. In a well-known study of 60 
large engineering projects, Miller and Lessard (2001) found that 40% of the projects were 
inefficient in terms of time, cost, and performance. More recent research on megaprojects 
found that 90% of projects have cost overruns of up to 50% (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
 
There is now a substantial body of literature that addresses the challenges of successfully 
managing the front-end development of large infrastructure projects. Debate exists about the 
root causes of these challenges and the explanatory power of different theories (e.g., 
Flyvbjerg, Ansar, Budzier, et al., 2018; Love & Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018; Gil & Pinto, 2018) 
but, to date, the dominant theme has been that large infrastructure projects often fail because 
sponsors and clients systematically make poor decisions during the planning phase (Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2003; Williams & Samset, 2010; Merrow, 2011, Flyvbjerg, 2014). To reduce the risk 
of failure, scholars recommend that the sponsor and client shape the vision and governance 
structure to prepare for an uncertain future (Morris & Hough, 1987; Miller & Lessard, 2001; 
Merrow, 2011) and avoid behavioral biases associated with the tendency to underestimate the 
costs and overstate the benefits of a project (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo, 
2009).  
 
Perhaps because of the paucity of examples, surprisingly little research has identified the 
factors contributing to the successful execution—or delivery—of large infrastructure projects. 
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Instead, scholars have focused on identifying some of the key dimensions that make 
infrastructure projects so difficult to manage, including:  
 The sheer size and scale of the task (Morris & Hough, 1987; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; 
Merrow, 2011);  
 The risks and uncertainty associated with their successful execution (Miller & 
Lessard, 2001; Floricel & Miller, 2001; Lenfle & Loch, 2010; Davies et al., 2017);  
 The complexity involved in managing the design and integration of system and array 
projects (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007; Davies & Mackenzie, 2014; Brady & Davies, 2014);  
 The urgency and pace of time within which projects must be completed (Morris & 
Hough, 1987; Shenhar & Dvir, 2007);  
 A client’s escalating commitment to a failing cause (Ross & Staw, 1993); and 
 Aligning and reconciling of diverse and often conflicting public and private interests 
in multiparty projects (Henisz, 2002; Scott et al., 2011; Henisz, Levitt, & Scott, 2012; 
Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012; Levitt et al., 2019).  
 
Another stream of research, which begins to unpack and identify what goes on inside the 
black box of megaproject delivery, recognizes that successful performance also depends on 
what happens during project execution, including forming a strong owner and capable 
leadership team (Merrow, 2011; Winch, 2014; Winch & Leiringer, 2016), developing new 
routines, practices and collaborative behaviors (Gil, 2009; Whyte, 2011; Davies et al., 2016; 
Tee et al., 2019), and establishing the capabilities needed to coordinate the design and 
integration of component parts of a complex system (Davies & MacKenzie, 2014; Brady & 
Davies, 2014). It is this shift that focused our attention on the management models used to 
deliver major infrastructure projects and how innovation was driving their evolution. 
 
Conceptualizing Delivery Models 
 
The word delivery appears with increasing frequency in project strategies, plans, and policy 
documents and is used by senior executives to describe how an infrastructure project will be 
organized and managed to design, construct, finance, and operate infrastructure projects. The 
term derives from the distinction made by clients, contractors, and consultants in the 
infrastructure sector between a development or planning phase and delivery or execution 
phase of a project. There was a shift in late 20th-century UK projects, such as Heathrow 
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Terminal 5, when clients spent more time carefully designing and developing a “delivery 
strategy” during the planning phase (Wolstenholme, Fugeman, & Hammond, 2008). As this 
practice has taken root, it has become increasingly common to hear practitioners then talking 
about the choice of “delivery model” to create and capture value throughout the life cycle of 
the project from execution to operational handover (Buck, 2018). Although this terminology 
conjures up a relationship analogous to that between business strategy and business models 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010), there is much less clarity about what exactly 
constitutes a delivery model.   
 
We see several different phases involved in the design, development, and enactment of a 
delivery model. The delivery model is designed and developed during a front-end planning 
phase when the sponsor and client define the overall strategic objectives or vision, shape the 
governance structure, secure financing, and prepare the contracting and procurement 
approach. An execution phase occurs when the project receives approval to proceed and 
contractors responsible for design, construction, integration, fit out, testing, and operational 
handover are employed to deliver the project. In some cases, the delivery model extends into 
an operational phase when a contract requires the provision of services to operate, maintain, 
and finance an asset over an extended period of time.  
 
There are also different ways of designing the organizational, contractual, and governance 
structures that constitute a delivery model. For example, two main contrasting types of 
delivery models can be identified based on whether the client is a permanent or temporary 
organization. When a client is a permanent organization, such as BP, Shell, and the London 
Underground, the client is responsible for delivering multiple infrastructure projects over 
time. A permanent client as an opportunity and incentive to assemble the capabilities and 
routines required to deliver each project and use the learning gained to improve the delivery 
model used for subsequent projects. When the client is a temporary organization (Lundin & 
Söderholm, 1995; Sydow, Lindkvist, & DeFillippi, 2004; Grabher & Thiel, 2015) established 
to deliver a single project, such as the London 2012 Olympics, there is less incentive to 
develop capabilities and routines because the organization is disbanded on completion of the 
project.   
 
It is not surprising that the concept of a delivery model has grown in popularity in the world 
of infrastructure alongside the widespread use of the term business model to describe how 
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firms are organized to create and capture value. Management scholars have developed in-
depth case studies of business models created by firms such as McDonalds, Facebook, 
Disney, and Toyota to describe how specific organizations grow successfully by creating and 
capturing value. Used to classify different organizations, each model may represent an 
exemplar case of a particular type of behavior or a type against which other organizations 
following a similar model can be compared (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). Similar work 
has yet to happen in project management and we believe that the literature on business 
models can provide a useful starting point for conceptualizing delivery models.  
 
Many firms involved in large infrastructure projects do have their own distinctive business 
models, such as Laing O’Rourke’s model centered on being a vertically integrated 
constructor or Jacobs’s, which is centered on a relationship-based model driven by long-term 
affiliations and alliances with repeat clients. The focus of a business model is on how a single 
firm continues to grow, prosper, and survive by creating and capturing value over time. A 
delivery model, by contrast, describes how the multiple parties involved in a project are 
organized and managed to create and capture value on a one-time basis and disbanded when 
the task is completed. Given this, project-based firms (e.g., Jacobs) and organizations (e.g., 
Highways England) might have multiple delivery models that can be deployed as part of their 
business model and broader organizational strategy (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010). 
Although we define delivery models at the project level, we recognize that large 
infrastructure projects are frequently organized as a program of interrelated projects and 
clients (e.g., Anglian Water, the UK water utility) work with delivery partners to improve the 
performance of a program of distinct projects over time. Understanding how delivery models 
interact within a program will be an important topic for future research on delivery strategies.  
 
Accepting that delivery models and business models are different, yet related, constructs is an 
important first step, but it is unlikely to produce interesting research unless we can agree on 
what constitutes a delivery model. In our discussions with scholars, senior executives, project 
directors, and managers, we have found that people often struggle when asked for a 
definition. It is one of those things about which people say: “I’ll know it when I see it.” 
Scholars can make an important contribution toward clarifying this discourse and distilling 
the concept to capture how value is created and captured for the project organization. 
Descriptions like an alliance or through lean construction techniques, with a delivery 
partner, by partnering or using the Heathrow Terminal 5 Model, each capture something 
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important, but on their own are incomplete. They are too abstract to provide recipes for 
organizational designers or too idiosyncratic for scholars to meaningfully characterize and 
compare the performance of different kinds of delivery models. Clearly we need a more 
nuanced and in-depth scholarly understanding of different types of delivery models and the 
consequences these have for performance. The contributions to this special issue take us a 
step closer toward this goal and, in concluding this essay, we draw inspiration from the 
articles to sketch out a series of building blocks we hope will further advance the field in this 
direction. 
 
Contributions to the Special Issue  
Taken together, the articles in this special issue paint a rich picture of what innovation in 
infrastructure delivery models looks like, the processes by which it is generated and evolves 
over time, and the consequences this has for organizations, institutions, and industries.  
Daniel M. Hall and W. Richard Scott open our special issue with a fascinating study that 
unpacks the emergence and institutionalization of a new form of delivery model—Integrated 
Project Delivery (IPD)—in the United States. We learn of the importance of Sutter Health as 
an institutional entrepreneur, the conditions that enabled it to perform this role, and witness 
the various manifestations of IPD emerge as this innovation diffused. The article provides 
inspiration and insight into the organizational building blocks, institutional scaffolding, and 
processes future entrepreneurs might draw on to innovative delivery models in other markets 
or even at other points in time. As such, the theoretical framework deployed also provides a 
template for other scholars to advance our understanding of the topic through thorough 
comparative research. This sort of comparative work would greatly enrich our field, which 
has traditionally excelled at understanding (and influencing) the evolution of delivery models 
within a given institutional environment (e.g., Davies et al., 2009; Whyte, in this issue), 
rather than seeking to explore how variations across industries and countries might shape the 
evolution of delivery models and the way “discrete structural choices” are made between 
alternatives (Williamson, 1991, p. 270). By doing so, Hall and Scott’s article serves as an 
exemplary case of how the field of project studies can benefit from a closer engagement with 
institutional theories, as recently argued by Biesenthal, Clegg, Mahalingam, and Sankaran 
(2018).  
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The second article turns our attention from questions longitudinal and historical, to those of a 
more comparative nature. To do so, Espen Solheim-Kile, Ola Laedre, and Jardar Lohne draw 
on agency theory to frame a comparative study of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in 
Norway. This article leverages rare access to contracts, participants, and stakeholders to 
problematize existing accounts of how PPPs create value for sponsors. Interestingly, they 
find that sensitivity to cost overruns made public sector actors more risk averse than 
traditionally assumed by agency theory. This insight helps explain observed risk transfers that 
existing theory would suggest are suboptimal and opens up a broader discussion of goal 
alignment between participants and how the characteristics of delivery models shaped this 
within their study. The authors’ evidence points to the importance of understanding how 
informal governance mechanisms, such as relational contracting, interact with formal PPPs’ 
governance mechanisms within a delivery model to shape project performance.  
Lena E. Bygballe and Anna Swärd’s article is third in our special issue and shifts our focus 
from broad conceptions of delivery models, and how they evolve and work, down to their 
enactment in the day-to-day practices of people within project organizations and what it takes 
to change them. This rich and insightful article draws on a longitudinal case study of a 
hospital construction project in Norway (2002–2014). The client, motivated by coordination 
problems experienced when using a delivery model built around traditional design-bid-build 
contracts, decided to create a more relational form of delivery model underpinned by the 
partnering approach (Barlow, Choen, & Jashapara, 1997; Bresnen & Marshall, 2000). The 
authors focus on the creation and destruction of organizational routines as a way of 
understanding how delivery model innovation happened in this setting. This approach brings 
to light the complexities of instantiating abstract notions—like Lean Construction—from a 
contract into the way work is actually done. The perspective the authors develop highlights 
the organizational truces (Nelson & Winter, 1984) that need to be built in order for 
coordination to be accomplished and the implications this process has for understanding how 
and when new delivery models are likely to succeed or fail. Given the temporary nature of 
projects, this way of understanding delivery model creation and institutionalization should 
provide fertile ground for future research and cause us to reflect on if and when we might see 
truces replaced by more permanent settlements between organizational actors (Rao & Kenny, 
2008; Gann, Salter, Dodgson, & Phillips, 2012).  
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From practices, we turn our attention to technology with Jennifer Whyte’s study of how 
digitization is transforming infrastructure delivery models in the fourth article in the special 
issue. Whyte’s ability to draw on 15 years of in-depth, multilevel data collection spanning 
multiple projects and field-level initiatives in Britain provides us with rare insight into the 
way project-to-project learning shapes the evolution of delivery models. The novelty of this 
article can be found in the way Whyte systematically traces the shift from analogue to digital 
forms of information and carefully links this shift to the emergence of three different 
generations of delivery model innovation within the UK market. This focus on information is 
an important shift for literature that has, to date, focused mostly on aspects like contracts and 
culture (e.g., Barlow, 2000; Gil, 2009) when seeking to explain the emergence of new 
delivery models. Whyte’s focus on digitization helps open up a new way of studying the 
sources of delivery model innovation and lays down markers for those seeking to codify this 
through taxonomies and typologies.    
The fifth and final article in the special issue by Kent Eriksson, Kim Wikström, Magnus 
Hellström, and Raymond E. Levitt draws on an ecosystem view to build a heuristic 
framework for understanding the governance choices involved in delivery model innovation. 
There are many different ways to characterize business ecosystems (e.g., Autio & Thomas, 
2014; Adner, 2017). Here the authors focus on workflows between actors involved in 
designing, building, operating, and using a new ship serving the short sea logistics market. 
The study is designed as a piece of action research and focuses on how different types of 
governance choices (e.g., introduction of an alliance) might enable whole of life costs 
associated with this industry to be reduced. The framework produced is highly flexible and 
should provide useful guidance for those seeking to better understand the nature of their 
project ecosystem when considering switching delivery models or embarking on efforts to 
innovate.  
Future Research on Delivery Models 
As editors, we have spent a lot of time talking about these articles and the broader topic of 
infrastructure delivery models. In doing so, we began to realize that each of these articles 
touched on a distinct, but interrelated, set of building blocks that could be seen as constituting 
a delivery model. These blocks ranged from the type of governance structure or 
organizational form selected through to the logic of value creation and capture. But those of 
us studying projects do not yet have a framework that brings together these various blocks 
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into a coherent whole. We see the challenge as analogous to that faced by scholars seeking to 
represent and understand business models (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). This literature 
offers a wide range of different ways of conceptualizing business models (cf. Mangematin & 
Baden-Fuller, 2015) and undoubtedly many could be applied to the phenomena of delivery 
models. There are several inter-related choices that one might use to dimensionalize a 
delivery model, such as: 
 Client value drivers: speed-to-market, life-cycle costs, or cost certainty;   
 Supply chain value creation mechanisms: design for manufacture and assembly or 
flexible engineering (de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011); 
 Supply chain value capture mechanisms: pain-gain risk allocations, reputation 
accumulation, cost-reimbursement, or change orders;  
 Governance mechanism: such as whether a shared-equity alliance, relational contract, 
or hard-money bilateral contract is used; 
 Organizational design: such as whether the organizational structure is integral 
(Design-Build-Transfer) or modular (Design | Build | Operate);   
 Technology: the use of BIM, augmented reality, artificial intelligence and other 
technologies to support design, construction, and operation; and  
 Project management capability: such as whether this is developed in-house, 
augmented with external providers (e.g., a delivery partner, such as Bechtel) or fully 
outsourced.  
The specification of a framework that might bring together these building blocks—such as a 
Delivery Model Canvas—is beyond the scope of this special issue, but we do see such 
typologies and taxonomies as a crucial step if future research is going to be able to generate a 
useful and empirically generalizable body of evidence on delivery models. This would help 
ensure that the subtle, but crucial distinctions between models are not lost when comparisons 
across time and institutional fields are being made. And it would also help ensure that the 
interdependencies (both positive and negative) that come with the combination of particular 
blocks into one delivery model can be adequately represented to both students, scholars, and 
practitioners. More broadly, we see such an advance as being a useful way for our field to 
replace generic descriptions of project organizations—such as megaproject—with something 
more meaningful. Without such a step, those of us studying delivery models are at risk of 
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ending up like the blind men in the parable of the elephant; each touching different parts of 
the elephant, but being unable to reconcile the whole. 
By shining a spotlight on the phenomena of delivery models and its relevance to policy and 
practice across a wide range of settings and times, we hope this special issue will inspire 
more scholars to begin pursuing this important line of inquiry.    
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